This article proposes a non-recursive detour for the perspectival concept of 'equivocation' by applying it to an ongoing ecopolitical approximation. I will describe how a Brazilian climatologist and a Yanomami shaman translate their concerns about the Amazonian rainforest in order to reach each other´s audiences. Drawing on their public appearances and published texts, it will be argued that they mimetically rephrase their environmental thinking according to-what they assume to bethe conceptual imagination and the formats of communication of the Other. The shaman's and the scientist's connective gestures are thus taken as part of an exceptional form of public, ecopolitical dialog, concerned with the future of the rainforest. Whereas the concept of 'equivocation' has proven useful to disclose the translational-ontological gap between the native´s and the very ethnographer´s conceptual languages, this article aims at looking somewhere-else than the recursive, ethnographic Self. In particular, the argument will pay attention to how equivocations and the so-called 'ontological differences' might be embodied by specific actors, in specific situations, inviting us to describe how these differences are de facto navigated and co-implicated by other people than anthropologists.
current environmental crises (see Vigh and Sausadal, 2014; Bessire and Bond, 2014; Fortun, 2014; Hornborg, 2015) .
In this paper I engage such debate by first presenting the following observation: I argue that the idea of 'incommensurability' has been imputed to some currents of the ontological turn (overview in Hazarika, 2016 ), yet it is not a flagship concept of their proponents. In fact, one of the most discussed authors within the ontological turn tradition, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, has explicitly distanced himself from the idea of incommensurability if this is seen as short-circuiting cultural translation and ontological 'inter-intelligibility' (2010: 330) . The notion of 1 incommensurability was first employed in post-positivist philosophy, most famously by Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1962) , to address the conceptual incompatibility between scientific theories, and the impossibility of detaching the empirical realities described from the theories that outlined them. Kuhn argued for the untranslatability between scientific theories, proposing that hermeneutics in the history of science is not about 'translation' but about becoming 'bilingual', that is: about learning how to keep separated two irreconciliable theoretical languages (2000:94) .
Despite the apparent resemblance with the comparative proposal of ontological theories, the problem of incommensurability has a very different nuance in anthropology, because comparison here is not between scientific theories but between cultures or peoples. The sheer extrapolation of post-positivist terms to anthropology, without further contextualization, would place 'our' notion of incommensurability onto the sensitive domain of reified differences according to ethnic or geographic criteria. This, I would argue, is far from being the goal of the ontological theories I will focus on. In fact, comparison and translation are at the core of the ontological turn´s project, so the notion of a culturally, ethnically or geographically pre-given incommensurability of relational worlds can be rather seen as a straw man that courts more misunderstandings than productive discussions within the discipline.
navigate the gap of the so-called equivocations.
The first part of the essay will briefly present the case of the scientist and the shaman public dialog, in order to promptly identify the specific interaction from which the following analytical questions will be raised. In the next two theoretical sections I will expose in more detail what I see as the analytical limitations of the notion of equivocation, showing its centrality for the ontological turn and in particular for the theory of perspectivism. Here I will ask what happens when equivocations are not only seen as recursive conceptual tools of and for anthropologists, but also as translational problems that the subjects we study can embody and re-translate themselves. With the aim of developing that question, in the following four sections, a case-centered look at the ecopolitical approximation between the shaman and the scientist will illustrate their equivocations and differences as well as their diplomatic efforts to navigate such translational gaps. I will propose the notion of 'ecopolitical mimicries' as a conceptual tool that might help to analyze these specific connective gestures as they are embodied by specific persons. In the last section, which is devised as a coda instead of conclusions, I will argue for the need to shift the analytical focus from ontological self-reflexivity to ecopolitical situatedness. This non-recursive turn relays on the perception that a too strong emphasis on the translational Self could blur the actual connections that different actors are drawing themselves in order to cooperate against current ecological crises.
Setting the scene, raising some questions
In 2010, the Brazilian climatologist Antonio Donato Nobre gave a TedX talk titled The Magic of the Amazon (Nobre, 2010a) , in which the scientist elaborated on the climatological relevance of the Amazonian rainforest. Antonio Nobre is one of the supporters and developers of a new and controversial theory called the Biotic Pump (BPT), which suggests that the evaporation of forest 4 trees may be a much more powerful driver of rainy winds than was previously assumed. In the middle of this talk, the scientist claimed that Amazonian indigenous views on the relation between rainfall patterns and the rainforest supported the BPT. Nobre explained that after attending a reading of a text by the Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa, he approached the shaman and asked: 'Davi, how did you know that if the forest is destroyed, there will be no more rain?'. To this, the shaman replied: 'The spirit of the forest told us'. According to Nobre, this insight surprised him because the Yanomami people had apparently already come 'to the same conclusion' that climate scientists were starting to develop now (Ibid).
For his part, the shaman Davi Kopenawa has struggled for the last two decades to bring
Yanomami cosmology to the 'white people' (Kopenwa & Albert, 2013: 133) . Besides his activity as president of the Comissão-ProYanomami (Commission for the Yanomami People) and his numerous speeches given all over the world, an important part of this effort has been the release of the cosmological and ecopolitical manifesto The Falling Sky: Words of a Yanomami Shaman (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013) . In this book, written with the help of his old friend, the anthropologist Bruce Albert, Kopenawa evokes in an autobiographical and detailed first person narrative his shamanic views on Yanomami cosmology, as well as his concerns regarding the social, economical and ecological danger in which the depredatory action of 'whites' has placed the Amazonian forest and its people.
Thus, on the one hand, the shaman Davi Kopenawa is assumed to be speaking from the point of view of a 'perspectival' or 'animistic' world of relations where the connections between persons, spirits and other beings are based on the premise of their shared humanity, while their disjunctions are given by their radically different bodily ‚perspectives', which result in ´ontological´ differences or ´differences of nature´ (Viveiros de Castro, 1998; . However, the shaman has shown an explicit willingness to write down in a book the terms by which what he calls Omama and the 'white people' call ´nature´ or 'ecology' could work together (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013: 397, explained below in more detail). A first question to arise is therefore: Can a book-that is, a disembodied form of communication-explore and express cosmo-ecological differences and connections, as does the body of the shaman in the context of shamanic rituals? In other words:
where is the shaman trying to get at in disembodying his knowledge in the form of a physical book?
And why exactly is Davi Kopenawa, and not any other shaman, exploring the communicative potential of the written discourse? 5
On the other hand, there is the natural scientist, a Brazilian climatologist with wellestablished research credentials, who pushes himself beyond the conceptual language of science.
Antonio Nobre stands as one of the supporters of the ground-breaking Biotic Pump Theory (explained bellow). Seeking the support of the theory by the wider public, the scientist not only has quoted an Amazonian shaman to capture the attention of wider audiences; he has also claimed, during another presentation, his willingness to 'see' the forest and the climate 'with the eyes of the spirits' (Nobre, 2010b: 39) . What sort of climatological 'seeing' is this? Is he not suggesting a desire to moving beyond his own naturalistic bodily perspective while adopting an animistic one? There is an obvious rhetorical intention in such an affirmation, but: is not the very staging of this affirmation, coming from a renowned naturalist, an invitation to further explore the current forms in which people from very different social and cultural contexts are trying to cooperate against the current ecological crisis?
Perspectivism and the body
In order to approach this case, I shall first propose an analytical frame based on a critical reading of the notion of translational 'equivocations' as it has been employed by ‚perspectivism' and associated ontological theories (Viveiros de Castro, 2004) . The theory of 'perspectivism', inserted two decades ago in the anthropological debates by the Amazonian anthropologists Tania Lima ([1995] 1999) and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro ([1996] 1998), has had great impact on the development of the ontological turn in anthropology (e.g., Holbraad, Pedersen and Viveiros de Castro, 2014) . 'Perspectivism', along with its attached notion of 'multinaturalism', have fostered new analytical apparatuses where anthropological differences are reconsidered as being 'ontological' or differences of 'world' in contrast to the -relativist-'epistemological' differences, or differences of 'knowledge' (Viveiros de Castro 1998). Roughly speaking, the combination of the notions of perspectivism and multinaturalism, emerging from Amazonian ethnographies but later adopted by scholars with other regional interests, has opened the possibility for questioning the (post)modernist equation of 'one nature -many cultures'', in order to propose a perspectival or multinaturalist inversion: 'one culture -many natures'. Such analytical inversion is made possible, according to its proponents, by abandoning the search of equivalences between conceptual languages in contact, and instead proposing an anthropology where analytical concepts emerge 6 from and make sense solely within the 'worlds' or 'ontologies' of the people we study (see Holbraad and Viveiros de Castro, 2016) .
I argue that one of the aspects that is often downplayed in the more recent ontological discussions is that perspectivism, as one of its central theories, stems from a specific Amerindian vision of the body as the place of difference, indeed a specifically Amazonian cosmological locus for the organization of intellectual and practical life (e.g. Erikson. 1996; Velthem, 2005; Karadimas, 2005; Viveiros de Castro et al., 2006; Overing, 2006) . I also suggest that the assumption of translational incommensurability implicit in some readings of perspectivism fades when the theory abandons the 'metaphysical exotic' (Eckert, Glick-Schiller and Reyna, 2016: 321) , in order to focus on specific ethnographic cases and embodied forms of interaction that claim for mutual inter-intelligibility.
In this regard, I find ethnographically clarifying Tania Lima's first formulation of the Amazonian notion of 'perspective' or 'point of view'. She explicitly disclosed there how personal pronouns signal the perspectival embodiment in Juruna language:
In my ethnographic material, the notion of point of view is indicated in a very simple way: the objective forms of personal pronouns receive the postposition be, 'to/for' ['para' in Portuguese](…).
Thus, a sentence such as 'this is a tapir to me' simply means that the subject uses a particular meat in the same way another uses the tapir (Lima [1995 (Lima [ ]1999 In Juruna language neither the Self nor the Other relate to a 'tapir' properly, in a univocal sense.
Self and Other share the idea of 'tapir', but their different points of view, i.e. their embodied perspectives, lead them to see and 'use' different types of meat as being the same: 'tapir'. As I understand the perspectival logic here, the theory makes the point that a concept such as 'tapir' does not designate a thing in particular, but a particular relation between two particular bodies. In other words, the relation 'tapir' (inasmuch as it can be seen as body-meat for feeding other bodies, for instance) always exists for two different beings (e.g. a Juruna person and a jaguar), but the tapir´s meat will be different things depending on the kind of body that is eating it. Thus, from a Juruna´s perspectival optic, a 'tapir' would be a specific relation between two bodies, an eating body (a The first assumption of perspectivist theory is that modern anthropological thinking has been colonized by a similar (yet perhaps more sophisticated) classificatory logic to the one expressed by Spaniards during la Conquista, hence leading us to equivocally reading the Amerindian body as a less elaborated or picturesque version of our own Wester-scientific notion of body-as-nature. The second and related assumption is that the 'control' of this equivocation would consist, according to Viveiros de Castro, in developing an anthropological comparison whose analytical concepts avoid collapsing the differences expressed in these conceptual languages, that is, the Amerindian idea of the 'body' as the place of essential (or 'ontologically radical' ) differences between beings (i.e. perspectivism, multinaturalism) and the European idea of the 'body' or nature as universal (i.e. naturalism).
The goal of the anthropologist as translator is, from such a standpoint, no longer that of finding culturally equivalent concepts, but rather that of disclosing how different are the relational 'worlds' or ontologies' that non-univocally related concepts address in different conceptual languages. In other words, the translative work operates here by expanding the knowledge about anthropological equivocations as a mode of comparison. The problem is that while the notion of ´´ 'controlled equivocation', as I understand it, claims for a cautious comparison between imperfectly related conceptual languages, its attachment to the notion of 'radical difference' has introduced into it the rather implicit but not less provocative idea that different cultures or peoples are incommensurable (meaning completely equivocated about each other?), and that only the recursive analysis of the anthropologist as observer is to be theorized.
Such recursive gesture is surely necessary, yet formulated in the ontological turn terms also runs the risk of reifying the very 'ontology' of the anthropologist as observer or pole of comparison.
This has given room to a number of mutual misunderstandings within the ontological debateincluding crossed accusations of conducting simplifying analyses (e.g. Viveiros de Castro, 2015; Graeber, 2015) . My point is that the recursive turn of the idea of equivocation, despite its legitimate goal of opening us to self-critique, produces a certain sense of fixation, for instance in not (explicitly enough) disclosing how crucially important 'differences' operate within the social sphere of the anthropologists themselves (see Candea, 2011) . This, I wish to argue, has alimented the straw man of ‚incommensurability' between the anthropologist´s world and the Other´s world, limiting in the last instance the possibilities of disclosing how these worlds change, permeate each other, and vary internally as the result of their contact.
One of the possible diagnosis for this problematic is that the ontological debate has been displaced to an argumentative level dominated by philosophical a priori about de facto 'radically different' ontologies vs. actually 'entangled' realities. This is a level of abstraction where one indeed may loose the grip of what people, not anthropologists, actually do in their encounters, that is the situated forms of inter-action that are available to ethnographic inquiry. Accordingly, the critique I wish to present here is that, despite the great theoretical interest that the concept of equivocation might have for anthropological comparison, the relational situations in which ethnographers usually engage or observe today are driven by something more than pure metaphysical difference. As a general argument, I will suggest that the subjects we study do something more than confirming how equivocated are anthropologists when they try to translate among different cultures or peoples.
While the radically different notions of 'body' of Spaniards and Amerindians could reveal the equivocated translations produced by colonial hermeneutics and anthropological metaphysics, it is worth noting not only that these equivocations might have been transformed since the time of La Conquista, but also that such transformations might be produced by the very subjects we study, in order to overcome old misunderstandings. For this reason, I propose to 're-embody equivocations'
with the aim of shifting its recalcitrant emphasis on cosmological or metaphysical difference per se to an empirically situated account of how specific Amazonian actors embody and re-translate themselves these differences, turning them into 'connections' when there is a need to reach out to others (see examples in Rosengren, 2006; Santos-Granero, 2009 ).
This proposal needs the rephrasing of a particular perspectivist assumption originated in Amazonian ethnographies. It has been argued that the idea of 'embodiment', as famously put forward by Csordas, is not valid for the Amazon-Amerindian context, since in this cosmological setting the notion of 'body' does not correspond to a physical 'substance' wherein one can situate the 'Self' (Vilaça, 2005) . Defined as 'point of view', the Amerindian 'Self' is a constantly shiftingquality, a positional feature, that guides subjects' social behavior according to the logics of a SelfOther relation-hunter-prey, human-spirit, kin-enemy, etc.-and independently of any bodilysubstantiated perspective. I argue that this cosmological take on the 'body' might be constitutive of an Amerindian internal, indigenous sociology, but it does not reflect what these same peoples do when they want to diplomatically relate or reach out to 'non-Amerindians'. I suggest that specific persons might in fact resort to their own biography, their particular habitus or embodied history, as originally put by Bourdieu (1980) , and find a personal connection there to those Others that are facing a related future of environmental collapse. Purely recursive or cosmological accounts of an ethnographic Self-Other difference become rather parametric if used to simply reject the threat that (what we call) climate change is posing to bodies as substances, selves or persons. In this regard, both the theory and the example brought to the fore in this article will show how the idea of embodiment may indeed help to analyze the ways in which particular persons, in specific situations, enact cosmological notions coming from relational modes such as the so-called 'perspectivism' and 'naturalism', and co-implicate them, in order produce a common ground for communication.
On equivocated rainforests
Since 2005, a group of microphysicists and climatologists have been developing the 'Biotic Pump Theory' (BPT), which has since its inception sparked intense controversy among atmospheric scientists (Gorshkov & Makaraieva, 2007; Makaraieva et al., 2013) . Unlike the widely accepted theory that holds that it is the Earth's rotation rate, the heating of the oceans, and atmospheric depth that are the main drivers of air masses, the BPT suggests that a more powerful driver of winds might be found in the biosphere, in particular in tropical forests. According to the BPT, the condensation of water vapour released by trees creates a rapid depression-a low-pressure zonethat powerfully attracts moist, high-pressure masses of air, which can be 'pumped' along thousands of kilometers, from oceans and seas towards the forest.
One of the supporters of the BPT is the climatologist Antonio Nobre who, in recent years, has not only defended it to his colleagues but has also intensively tried to communicate the climatological importance of the Amazonian rainforest to a wider audience, with the hope of affecting the debate around environmental policies on an international level (Nobre, 2009 (Nobre, , 2010b The scientist went on to make an argument for 'turning the Hubble telescope upside down' (Ibid:
16:51), that is, towards the forest, so that we see its cosmic isomorphism as well as those properties of the biosphere that determine the dynamics of the atmosphere. He was right that Kopenawa does not need the Hubble to know about the relation between trees and rain. However, he was equivocal in presuming that Kopenawa, therefore, does not see that relation. On the contrary, Kopenawa has argued precisely that 'white people don't know the images of the rain being and his children. They probably think the water falls from the sky without reason! But me, I have often contemplated them in my dreams, like my elders saw them before me' (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013: 133) . It is exactly by 'bringing down' images that shamans gather their knowledge; it is another way of seeing which is exclusive to shamans and constitutes the main technology for knowing their world (see Albert, 2014: 240) .
Such observations seem to lead us back to the classic Spaniards-Amerindians equivocation of what 'bodies' are or can do. Antonio Nobre assumes that the ways in which shamans 'see' are identical to the ways in which scientists 'see'. What confounds the scientist is the naturalist attribution of having the same body abilities, and where he misses the point, at least from a perspectival standpoint, is in not being aware that shamans actually 'see' with an interior sight, i.e.
'with closed eyes' (see Villani et al., 2011) , in the context of shamanic rituals and dreams.
If the body of the scientist and the shaman can be seen as places of translational equivocation, it is no less difficult to establish direct equivalences between their respective environmental concepts and images. It holds true, as Antonio Nobre suggests in his talk, that there are some conceptual parallels between what some climate scientists supporting the BPT and
Amazonian shamans say about the relation between trees and rain. However, one may wonder whether these evident parallels are enough to claim that scientists and shamans have come 'to the same conclusion' (Nobre, 2010a) . Here it is worth considering what Davi Kopenawa actually says about the relation between Amazonian trees and rain:
As soon as you cut down tall trees such as the wari mahi kapok trees and the hawari hi Brazil nut trees, the forest's soil becomes hard and hot. It is these big trees that make the rainwater come and keep it in the ground. The trees that white people plant, the mango trees, the coconut trees, the orange trees, and the cashew trees, they do not know how to call the rain. (Kopenawa & Albert, 2013: 385) .
Both the scientist and the shaman recognize that there is a relation between trees and rain, and that such a relation should pose certain limits to the human action on the Amazonian environment. But for all the apparent convergences, such a relation is strikingly different if we approach it from the 4 shaman's or the scientist's perspective. By laying bare the physical causes and effects of microphysical systems on climate, the work of Nobre appears very different from the work of Kopenawa, who is negotiating with the sky through powerful xapirí-spirit beings (Ibid: 131-32). Further, it could be argued that it is not only the relation between trees and the rain they elicit that is different, Bruce Albert points out in an endnote to the above-quoted passage that 'there is an interesting connection It is worth recalling at this point that the BPT suggests that the climatological relation occurring at the limits of the atmosphere-biosphere is thought of as being driven by the mechanism of a 'pump'. The metaphor selected here seems crucial, since it reflects plainly the ´naturalist´ aspiration to a full 'mechanization of the world' (Descola, 1996: 97) . The relation between trees and rain is likewise one of the issues at stake for the shaman, but the 'calling' of rain performed by some trees (Kopenawa & Albert, 2013: 385) 
Diplomatic translations
However important it is to stress such differences of 'livable worlds', I argue that there is something more than translational equivocations to be addressed in Kopenawa's specific comparison of white and Yanomami environmental thinking. I suggest that the exploration of the ways in which these actors engage a conceptually dynamic space, where these same translational differences seem to be explicitly renegotiated for the sake of a meaningful dialogue is equally interesting:
When they speak about the forest, these white people often use another word: they call it 'environment'. This word is also not ours and until recently we did not know it either. For us, what the white people refer to in this way is what remains of the forest and land that were hurt by their machines (…) I don't like this word. The earth cannot be split apart as if the forest were just a leftover part. We are inhabitants of this forest, and if we cut apart this way, we know that we will die with it. I would prefer the white people to talk about 'nature' or 'ecology' as a whole thing (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013: 397 for it contains the implicit notion of 'halving' the environment. For him, the rainforest is 'the entire world' (Ibid: 60) and should be 'understood as a whole' (397). However, the point I wish to make here is that he is not only disclosing an eco-cosmological difference with respect to what he assumes to be 'white people's' ways of conceiving of the 'environment' -with their tendency to analytically divide it into discrete units; he is also showing a translational indulgence towards other terms, such as 'nature', 'ecology' or even 'forest', which are likewise imperfect or equivocated, but which he is disposed to accept. In the above-quoted passage, Kopenawa scales up the parameters of comparison of the translation urihi-rainforest in order to leave more room, as it were, for other meanings to come inside urihi, and coexist.
I argue that the shaman is trying to diplomatically produce a space for conceptual negotiation where the co-implication of relational modes such as 'perspectivism' and 'naturalism' is made explicit. By co-implication I mean therefore in the first place the deliberate act by which apparently opposed perspectives are put in motion together by a specific social actor. Another central aspect of the co-implication of perspectives is that it needs explicitness in order to become an effective tool of communication. Such explicitness has then a diplomatic and even cosmopolitical sense, which is inspired by Stengers´ observation that if there is no agreement about the cosmos, then diplomats must at least be able to establish 'explicit contrasts ' (2005: 193) . I
would add that these contrasts should allow both sides of a cosmopolitical or, to be more precise, ecopolitical negotiation, to be aware of their differences as well as of their possibilities of cooperation. This is exactly the diplomatic intention I read in Kopenawa's point on the translational pair urihi-rainforest. In the following sections, I shall further explore how such contrasts are expressed and navigated through some mimetic gestures that put the scientist's and the shaman's bodies at the center of their strategic approximation.
Extensive and intensive bodies
In 2001 skin' (ibid) in the eyes of the indigenous audience, but also an analytical partition of his own body, aimed at destabilizing the scale of differences assumed by some people in the room. At least 1/8 of the scientist's body did not exactly fit, as it were, in what was assumed to be 'his world'.
Furthermore, it was precisely this fraction of himself from which the scientist offered a new scalar frame for a negotiation of meaning.
I suggest that the fact of the scientist resorting to his 1/8 of non-white ancestry, translated as a bodily substance-i.e. Indigenous and Afro-American 'blood', was flagged by Nobre as a sort of 'common ground' for a diplomatic encounter . Moreover, I argue that this gesture sets up an Kopenawa's case, the diplomatic art would consist of his ability to 'become other' (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013: 205-220) , an ability which is mainly (trans)corporeal and that, as documented in other studies, makes shamans exceptional mediators not only with the beings of the forest, but also with the world of 'whites' (e.g. Vilaça, 2000; Kelly 2005 ).
It could then be said that both the scientist and the shaman experimentally elicit some nonevident qualities of their bodies in order to reach out to each other. Yet there are some important differences in these gestures of approximation that should be stressed. The most celebrated theoretical position from which anthropology has addressed such kinds of differences as they materialize in the Amazon region is perspectivism, and there is, in perspectival anthropology, the 'virtual' that does not mean not-real -that is: opposed to the ‚ 'real'-but opposed to the 'actual' (Deleuze, 1968: 269-70) . In other words, in Kopenawa´s context the 'becoming other' would be virtual in the sense that his internal multiplicity is in constant process of actualization, for the shaman has always the 'intrinsic ability to be something else' or 'infinitely differing from itself' (Viveiros de Castro, 2006: 324) .
What the virtual aspect of the shamanic becoming-other tells us is not then that his diplomatic-bodily change happens in a dreamed or hallucinated 'world' as opposed to a real one.
Rather, it tells us that the sorts of differences and relations that shamans deal with are what in a Deleuzian jargon are called 'intensive' (see Deleuze, 1968:286- As far as we know from the ethnographic literature concerned, therefore, the cosmic diplomacy enacted by Kopenawa relates to a becoming-other that originates in the intensive differences existing within his body as potential triggers of shamanic transformation. Since these differences are 'intensive', they cannot be used to divide or fraction his body, as though it were a geometrical space or extension. The way shamanism conceptualizes the body is 'intensive' in the sense that its transformations involve whole changes of nature, and not divisions of a measurable extension (see Deleuze, 1968; Delanda, 2005a) . In other words, when Kopenawa 'becomes other' it is his entire body or nature, not just a part of it, that is transformed into something else.
We have previously seen Kopenawa's explicit claim for considering urihi -the rainforest-'as a whole', that is, as a non-fractionable entity (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013: 397) . Such a cosmological principle is then likewise extendable to notions of the intensive and indivisible bodies of shamans as mediators between beings. This, one may argue with perspectival anthropology, is in clear contrast with the way in which the climatologist elicited a geometrical fractioning of his body with diplomatic goals. The climatologist's bodily differences were delimited in his body as extension, a physical space whose nature was one and remained therefore independent of the relation at stake. Following the Deleuzian-Amazonian-perspectival triad, we are hence invited to confirm the two radically different understandings of embodied difference and transformation: in the case of the scientist, 'extensive' differences that divide space, and the bodies within space, into discrete units that might be isolated and then recombined for enabling change; and in the case of the shaman, 'intensive' differences that have the potential to transform the body by an internally driven process of 'becoming other', in nature and as a 'whole'-rather than by its physical partition and recombination with fragments of other bodies.
Experimental mimicries
That said, it is now worth noting that this way of identifying 'radical differences' might be analytically useful, but it would benefit from being explicitly evoked as a mode of comparison based on changing and intermingling types, and not as a parametric anthropology whose'ontological' inferences cannot be transgressed and modified by the specific social actors it is set to study . Even from a metaphysical perspective, 'intensive' and 'extensive' differences such as the 7 ones evoked above, can only be understood in their co-implication. This is at least what I read in the remark that Deleuze posed to Bergson's too static separation of the 'extensive' differences of degree and the 'intensive' differences of nature (Deleuze, 1968 : 308, see also De Landa, 2005b . In science, by intensive data are meant those unities that are not divisible without changing their internal 8 nature, such as temperature or atmospheric pressure (whose quality is an intensive and non-divisible quantity), in contrast to extensive properties such as a volume or mass, whose division does not alter the internal structure of each resulting sample (their quality is an extensive and divisible quantity). Actually, it happens that some intensive properties are also the ratio of two or more extensive properties: e.g. density,
which is an intense property, is the resulting ratio of mass and volume, which are two extensive properties (Ibid).
actions are supposed to respond to, but to a confined set of breakthrough, explicit gestures.
Following these lines, in the next pages I propose to analytically frame such gestures as 'experimental mimicries'.
The idea of 'mimesis' has already been employed in order to describe how in colonial times indigenous peoples imitated the behavior of invaders in order to deal with and even trick them (Taussig, 1993) . More recently, 'mimetic empathy' has also been used to argue that the Yukaghir hunters of northern Siberia show 'the ability to put one's self imaginatively in the place of another, reproducing in one's own imagination the form of the Other's perspective' (Willerslev, 2004: 647) .
This mimetic empathy, Willerslev argues, allows hunters to conserve a 'double perspective': that of the hunter and that of the impersonated prey, and discloses how the perspectival 'becoming other' cannot be taken in any absolute sense when it is regarded against the practical life-worlds that ethnography describes (629-30). I suggest that this ability to reproduce 'in one's own imagination the form of the Other's perspective' has not only a practical side, but also an ecopolitical potential.
When Antonio Nobre claims that he would like to 'see' the forest and the climate 'with the eyes of the spirits' (2010b: 39), he is arguably not only expressing a willingness, but also signaling a disposition to adopt another perspective. He made it very clear when he invoked Davi Kopenawa's take on the relation between forest trees and rain (Nobre, 2010a) . One may argue that he was just addressing the shaman's perspective in a metaphorical sense, as a rhetorical gesture. And indeed there is a deliberate staging in the way and the context in which the scientist makes such an
affirmation. Yet the gesture remains still anthropologically relevant, to my view, insofar as it discloses a strategy of science communication where two discourses, that of science and that of shamanism, may ´resonate´ in each other and thus gain ´mutual amplification´ (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984: 46) .
So it would be unfair to simply neglect the ecopolitical potential of the scientist's allusion to the shaman. Nobre´s project is that of producing a 'synthesis of knowledge' aiming at confronting the climatological future of the Amazonian region (2014) . That means that with such a gesture the scientist is conserving his own naturalistic perspective -his synthesis is still of ‚knowledge', that is epistemological, and therefore not of ´worlds´, or ontological perspectives. But the gesture has nevertheless an ecopolitical and therefore anthropological interest, for it is built upon the recognition of the lack of knowledge about the Other -clearly expressed in Nobre´s wondering:
´how could he know that?' (Nobre, 2010a: 14:51) . This is why I will suggest next that the scientist'sgesture should be addressed as being experimentally ´mimical´, and not as a mere ´reference to´, in as much as it displays a bodily disposition to navigate the anthropological distance with respect to the counterpart, without necessarily undoing such distance by means of an absolutely certain knowledge about how things work in the context Other, i.e. shamanism
In the first place, I want to make clear that the election of the idea of 'mimicry' aims at deliberately avoiding the incursion into the difference that Bourdieu (1980) saw between the oftenrelated concepts of 'mimesis' and 'imitation'. Exposed in his discussion about the idea of 'habitus', Bourdieu identified imitation as a reflexive process and mimesis as a mirroring that was not subject to consciousness (Bourdieu, 1980: 123) . The kind of gesture I address here is however hardly amenable to either a closed dimension of conscious intentional imitation or a non-reflexive mimesis. Rather, a particular mixture of political intentionality and anthropological uncertainty seem to drive the scientist's connective gesture. This is why I do not see the scientist's mimetic gestures as collapsing differences or effectively closing the gap of translational equivocations. On the contrary, the awareness of an equivocation seems to be what constitutes the climatologist's disposition to adopt the regard of the 'spirits', in order to come as close as possible to the shaman's conceptual imagination. I would therefore situate this gesture in the terrain of a mimetic 'experiment': neither fully conscious nor totally unintentional, where the driver is precisely the willingness to cope with a certain gap of knowledge, without undoing it. The ´connection´ is therefore not established by a reference, in the form of a complete knowledge about the counterpart -where the referrer assumes to know the referred without fissures; instead, the connection is intuitively mimicked, and indeed experimentally mise en scene, with the aim of ´exporting´ a message to a anthropological domain yet to know.
On the other hand, the scientist seems to position himself in a non-orthodox perspective within the field of climate science. This is done not only by supporting a controversial theory, but also by exposing himself to a field of relations-e.g. popular science talks-that clearly overhauls that is, his particular habitus or 'embodied history' (Bourdieu, 1980: 111) ' (2014: 316) . This is why throughout the book the reader has the impression that when Kopenawa speaks about himself and his body, he is also telling us something about the forest.
Yet Kopenawa does something more than, from a sheer perspectival or animistic point of view, compare his body to the forest's body according to their equal human agency and responsivity. He is also interested in 'whites'' disembodied forms of thinking. This is for instance how he compares Yanomami and 'whites'' modes of registering and transmitting knowledge: words inside our bodies. But for the white people to hear them they must be drawn like their own, otherwise their thought remains empty. If these ancient words only come out of our mouths, they don't understand them and they instantly forget them (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013: 24) .
I suggest that it is precisely because Kopenawa, as Nobre, is able to recognize the gap of the equivocation between embodied and disembodied forms of communication that he tries to navigate such distance by 'sending [his] words far away' and fixing them in 'image skins' (ibid), in a rather unconventional way from the vantage point of shamanic performances. This is also why in 2000 he held up, in the context of a shamanic ritual, the satellite image of the Earth's extension, the image of a planisphere (see Albert, 2014) . This gesture destabilized the usual form of 'bringing down images' in conventional shamanic practices. That fixation of the image of the world in a rectangle of paper can be seen as an 'innovative form of political shamanism ' (Ibid: 238) , which aims at engaging or at least experimenting with the conceptual imagination and the communicative formats of whites.
These kinds of gestures are not mere spectacle, but potentially ground-breaking, mimetic incursions into the relational logics of the Other, which deserve some anthropological attention. As it has been already argued for the scientist, the shaman´s gestures are likewise mimetic, because conducted by the shaman with the complicity and support of the anthropologist Bruce Albert. The book in itself can be seen as a gesture-a remarkable disembodiment, which is anthropologically interesting due to the rupturing character that the writing down of thoughts involves for a shaman.
For instance, Kopenawa clearly states in the book that the rainforest is 'urihi a, the forest-land, but also its image that can only be seen by shamans and that we call urihinari, the spirit of the forest' (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013: 388 in which a shaman speaks about spirits to whites, and equally about whites on the basis of spirits, and both these things through a white intermediary' (cf. Albert and Kopenawa, 2013: 448) . In his introduction to the Portuguese translation, Viveiros de Castro (2015) points out the 'reaching out' aspect of Kopenawa's gesture, where he concedes that the book is an attempt to overcome the 'cosmological monolingüism'. I suggest that it is not only the content of the book, but also the book as disembodied materiality for communicating, that shows both the mimetic and the experimental aspect of such a gesture. A book is without any doubt a technology of the whites. At the beginning of The Falling Sky, Kopenawa tells the reader that he is putting his words down on 'paper skins' so that they-and the words of the xapiri -could travel to the world of the whites, far away, and propagate, in order to make them 'truly be heard', and 'penetrate the minds' of the whites (Ibid, 12).
So the original words pronounced by the shaman may not have transgressed Yanomami shamanic conventions, but their translation, and their 'fixation' in geometric paper skins that will travel far away, reflects the shaman's intuition that the mimicry of alien formats of communication may aid to reach out to the imagination of those others yet to know.
Coda. Situating ecopolitical translations
Instead of asking what is the truly ontological question (as in metaphysics), this essay was initiated by asking what needs an ontological comparative tool such as 'translational equivocations' in order to adequately account for a particular situation of cross-cultural communication. The elaboration on whether ´worlds´ are commensurable or not did not seem, in this regard, to be the best option to bring the here proposed anthropological critique far enough. Despite all controversies courted by the ontological turn, and besides the 'radical' and --most of all--provocative quality of itsconceptual tools, I still understand it as an extension of a rather classic and indeed very useful mode of anthropological critique, which has recently been labeled as 'genealogical': "Genealogy is interested in identifying what counts for true and false in a given world at a given moment (both concepts of perspective and picture not presupposing the existence of truth and falsehood but emphasizing power and language games between the two) (Fassin 2017:14) .
Ontologically recursive anthropology has similar-wise proposed some theoretical tools that make sense of the worlds of the people we study, without pretending to equate their concepts and ours as the way to achieving a final truth or producing a neutral observation (see Holbraad and Viveiros de Castro, 2016) . However, the comparison of 'their' concepts with 'our' concepts is, to The position of a diplomat in a given ecopolitical negotiation is therefore ontologically liminal and also politically delicate. And as far as we know, diplomatic work always involves the assumption of a risk, which is defined by their effort to appear 'in front of other peoples with a new peace offering (…), to rephrase their requirements (…) [and with this] running the risk of being called unscrupulous traitors' (Latour, 2007: 20 ; see also Stengers, 2005: 193) . This is why Nobre and other scientists involved in the Biotic Pump Theory are still facing the skepticism that the originality of the theory triggers among some of their colleagues ; and this is also the reason why 10 Kopenawa is aware that his interest and openness to the world of whites have been used to accuse him of having 'become a white man' and 'not being a real Yanomami' (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013: 436).
The mimetic gestures I have presented here can be seen as the embodiment-or disembodiment, in the case of The Falling Sky-of these diplomatic risks in the persons of a shaman and a scientist. Their 'treason', it could be argued, is that of mimicking the concepts and and navigate them, and propose the adequate tools to address these translational gestures in its full
The originality of the Biotic Pump Theory makes it indeed very attractive to the wider public, whilst is a 10 focus of intense discussions and controversies among scientists of the field, as noted by an important editor (see http://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2013/01/28/richard-smith-the-editor-thinks-yourpaper-is-nonsense-but-will-publish-anyway/).
